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The Case for a Statutory Second
Degree Felony-Murder Rule in
California
In the recent case of People v. Dillon' the California Supreme Court
was asked to abolish the first degree felony-murder rule.' The defen-
dant, who had been convicted of first degree felony-murder for kill-
ing while attempting to commit robbery, 3 argued that no statutory
authority existed in California to compel the court to apply the first
degree felony-murder rule.' According to the defendant, the first degree
felony-murder rule, as applied in California, was a common-law crea-
tion of the courts,5 and therefore, judicially abolishable.6 The defen-
dant supported his call for abrogation of the first degree felony-murder
rule by citing the many attacks which have been made against the
legitimacy of the felony-murder doctrine by legal scholars7 and the
disfavor expressed toward the felony-murder rule by the supreme court
itself in past decisions. 8 Nevertheless, the supreme court rejected the
1. 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
2. Id. at 462, 668 P.2d at 708, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
3. An unlawful killing, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, occurring during an
attempt to commit robbery, is murder in the first degree in California. CALJIC No. 8.21.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE §189.
4. 34 Cal. 3d at 462, 668 P.2d at 708, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
5. Id.
6. Common law that has no statutory basis is subject to judicial modification or abroga-
tion. See Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 393-98, 525 P.2d 669, 676-79,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772-75 (1974); People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 346-48, 351, 455
P.2d 132, 135-36, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199-200 (1969); People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 39 (1875).
If a judge-made law is found to be unwise or outdated, a court is free to "exercise [its] role
in the development of the common law" by abrogating that law. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d
304, 329 (1980).
7. 34 Cal. 3d at 462, 668 P.2d at 708-09, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02. One of the first
criticisms leveled at the felony-murder doctrine by a legal commentator was made by Eden
(Baron Auckland) in 1771. Eden characterized the doctrine as "reconciled to the philosophy
of slaves." EDEN, PaNCntES OF PENAL LAW 206-10 (1771). Recent attacks have been made
by LAFAvE & ScorT, CRIMNAL LAW 554 (1972)(terming the doctrine as involving a "somewhat
primitive rationale"); Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations, 51 Ky. L.J.
59, 82 (1962) (characterizing the felony-murder doctrine as a "historic survivor for which there
is no logical or practical basis for existence in modern law"); Packer, The Case For Revision
Of The Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REv. 252, 259 (1961)(noting that the doctrine is "unnecessary
in almost all cases in which applied"); Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts
of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956) (admonishing that the felony-murder rule should
not be expanded and questioning the deterrence justification for the rule). See also Note, 71
HARv. L. REv. 1565 (1958)(same).
8. 34 Cal. 3d at 462-63, 668 P.2d at 708-09, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02. The California
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call to abolish the first degree felony-murder rule, holding that the
California Legislature had intended the rule to be codified in Penal
Code Section 189.1 The court subsequently held section 189
constitutional,' 0 thereby precluding judicial abrogation of the first
degree felony-murder doctrine in California."
A statement was made by the court in a footnote to Dillon which
merits attention. After finding that the first degree felony-murder rule
had been intended by the 1872 legislature to be codified in section
189, the court distinguished the second degree felony-murder rule as
"judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code."' 2
This characterization of the second degree felony-murder rule is pure
dictum because the issue whether the second degree felony-murder
rule is codified in the Penal Code was not before the court in Dillon.'
This characterization of the second degree felony-murder rule is pure
the Dillion court as judge-made law is significant, however, in two
respects.
Supreme Court has criticized the felony-murder doctrine for "erod[ing] the relationship be-
tween criminal liability and moral culpability," People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783,
402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965); for being "in almost all cases in which
it is applied .... unnecessary," id.; and because the doctrine "artifically imposes malice as to
one crime because of defendant's commission of another [while] it anachronistically resurrects
from a bygone age a 'barbaric' concept that has been discarded in the place of its
origin [England] . . . ." People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 583 n.6, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6,
51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 n.6 (1966).
9. 34 Cal. 3d at 472, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408. All section references will
be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
10. Id. at 476, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The defendant in Dillon had argued,
in the alternative, that should the first degree felony-murder rule be found embodied in the
Penal Code, the statute constituted an unconstitutional violation of due process because it
authorized a murder conviction without requiring that every element of murder be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 472, 668 P.2d at 715-16, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09. See in re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The defendant contended that because the element of malice
aforethought, required to be present in every instance of murder, was conclusively presumed
to exist as a result of an application of the felony-murder rule, the existence of malice
aforethought in his killing had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 34 Cal. 3d at
472, 668 P.2d. at 715-16, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09. The supreme court rejected this argument,
holding that malice aforethought, as it is conclusively presumed by the operation of the felony-
murder rule, is not an element of felony-murder. Id. at 472-76, 668 P.2d at 715-18, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 408-11.
11. Judicial review of a statute duly promulgated by the legislature is limited to an ex-
amination of the constitutionality of the statute. See Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 77,
485 P.2d 785, 796, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 444 (1971); Factor (Max) & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.
2d 446, 454-58, 55 P.2d 177, 181-82, (1936), aff'd 299 U.S. 198 (1936); Yolo Co. v. Clogan,
132 Cal. 265, 274-75, 64 P. 403, 407 (1901). See generally CAL. CoNSi. art. 111, §3. Since
the first degree felony-murder rule was found by the court to be embodied in Penal Code
Section 189, and since Penal Code Section 189 subsequently was held to be constitutional,
no authority existed for the court to comply with the request made by the defendant to abolish
the rule. 34 Cal. 3d at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
12. 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. 408 n.19.
13. Dillon had been convicted of killing while attempting to commit robbery. Robbery
is one of six felonies enumerated in Penal Code Section 189 capable of supporting a first degree
felony-murder conviction. See supra note 3. The second degree felony-murder rule is implicated
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First, the court relinquished the ability to abrogate half of the
disfavored felony-murder rule by holding that the first degree felony-
murder rule is codified and constitutional." By characterizing the sec-
ond degree felony-murder doctrine as judge-made law, the court has
left that portion of the rule vulnerable to judicial abolition in a future
case. 5 The separation of powers doctrine that precluded judicial
abrogation of the first degree felony-murder doctrine in Dillon'6 will
not be a barrier to a judicial decision to abolish that portion of the
felony-murder rule held to be exclusively judge-made.' 7 If the supreme
court directly confronts the issue in a future case and confirms the
dictim of the Dillon decision by holding that the second degree felony-
murder rule is without any basis in the Penal Code, second degree
felony-murder will become subject to abrogation at the discretion of
the court.'"
Second, before concluding that the first degree felony-murder rule
is codified in section 189, the court thoroughly analyzed the legislative
intent behind the promulgation of that statute.' 9 In contrast, when
declaring the second degree felony-murder rule to be judge-made and
without express statutory basis, the court cited the 1966 supreme court
case of People v. Phillips, 2 a case in which no attempt was made
by the court to discern a possible legislative intent to codify the sec-
ond degree felony-murder doctrine. 2' The Dillon court did not ex-
plain why the second degree felony-murder doctrine may be discarded
as uncodified common law without need for a determination of
whether the legislature intended to codify the rule. 22 Assuming that
upon a killing in the attempt or commission of a felony not listed in Penal Code Section 189
that is inherently dangerous to human life. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d
353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1966); People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 457, 406 P.2d
647, 649, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 9 (1965). Dillon was not accused of killing during the commission
of any felony other than robbery. 34 Cal. 3d at 450, 668 P.2d at 700, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. "This court does not sit as a super-legislature
with the power to judicially abrogate a statute merely because it is unwise or outdated." 34
Cal. 3d at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. 34 Cal. 3d at 464-72, 668 P.2d at 710-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403-08.
20. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
21. Id. at 582-84, 414 P.2d at 360-61, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33. The inquiry of the court
in Phillips centered on the question whether the second degree felony-murder rule could be
applied despite the lack of an express basis for the doctrine in the Penal Code, and the issue
whether grand theft is a felony inherently dangerous to life. Id.
22. 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19. The court
required less than one full sentence to relegate the second degree felony-murder rule to common-
law status. The entire passage reads "...and the second degree felony-murder rule remains,
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the court will entertain a request to abolish the second degree felony-
murder doctrine in the near future, 23 determining whether the 1872
legislature intended to codify the rule is of critical importance. The
existence of legislative intent to codify the second degree felony-murder
doctrine in section 189 would preclude judicial abrogation of that rule.24
The success of the analysis developed in Dillon to discern legislative
intent to codify the first degree felony-murder rule suggests that a
similar analysis also could unearth legislative intent to codify the sec-
ond degree felony-murder rule. This analysis has not been undertaken
as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code
(see People v. Phillips...and cases cited)." Id. The court has not undertaken to discern legislative
intent to codify the second degree felony-murder rule apparently because it has not been re-
quired. In 1966, the court held in Phillips that the second degree felony-murder doctrine may
be applied regardless'of a Penal Code basis for the rule. 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360,
51 Cal. Rptr. at 232. In 1983, the supreme c6urt cited Phillips for the same proposition. 34
Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19. In the 17 years separating
the two opinions, the supreme court consistently has cited Phillips as authority for application
of the second degree felony-murder rule and has not inquired whether the legislature intended
to codify the doctrine. See People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 755-56, 518 P.2d 342, 346, 111
Cal. Rptr. 910, 914 (1974); People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 184, 481 P.2d 193, 198, 93
Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 (1971); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 538, 450 P.2d 580, 589, 75
Cal. Rptr. 188, 197 (1969). Prior to Phillips, Penal Code Section 189 had been assumed by
the court to embody the second degree felony-murder rule. No inquiry had been made, however,
to discern legislative intent to codify the doctrine in that statute. See People v. Washington,
62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445, 446 (1965); People
v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 149, 330 P.2d 763, 767 (1958); People v. Wright, 167 Cal.
1, 5, 138 P. 349, 351 (1914); People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 171-72, 78 P. 549, 550 (1904);
People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 125-26 (1889). Although no express basis for the second degree
felony-murder rule exists in the Penal Code, decisional law has established the authority from
which the rule is applied. People v Lovato, 258 Cal. App. 2d 290, 292, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638,
640 (1968). The court in Phillips appears to rely upon an uninterrupted history of second degree
felony-murder convictions when characterizing the crime to be "imbedded in [California] law."
64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
23. A trend has developed to restrict or abrogate the felony-murder doctrine. The rule
has been abolished in England. See Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz, II, c.11, §1. Five states,
including Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Iowa and Ohio, have abolished the doctrine either ex-
pressly or constructively. See HAWvAn REV. STAT. §707-701; Ky. REV. STAT. §507.020; People
v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2903.04 (defining as involuntary
manslaughter the death of another proximately caused by the attempt or commission of a felony);
State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1979)(Iowa Supreme Court ruling that the issue of
malice aforethough cannot be satisfied by proof of intent to commit the underlying felony).
A plurality of the court in Dillon indicated an apparent willingness to abrogate the first degree
felony-murder rule by approving of the reasoning employed by the Michigan Supreme Court
in People v. Aaron when that court abolished the common-law felony murder rule of that
state. 34 Cal. 3d at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402. In her concurring opinion
to Dillon, Chief Justice Bird states "the time seems to be at hand for doing away with that
portion of the 'barbaric' anachronism which we are responsible for creating" when discussing
the second degree felony-murder rule. Id. at 494, 668 P.2d at 731, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
The State Public Defender of California has taken the position that the second degree felony-
murder rule is uncodified in California and judicially disfavored and has indicated that in the
appropriate case brought before the court by that office, abrogation of the rule will be sought.
See quote on file at the Pacific Law Journal.
24. See supra notes 11 and 16 and accompanying text.
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by the supreme court to date.25 The Dillon court did not acknowledge
that the 1872 legislature may have intended to codify the second degree
felony-murder rule,26 but proof of that intent is provided by the same
arguments accepted by the court when holding that the legislature
intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule in section 189.
This author asserts that notwithstanding the current supreme court
position that second degree felony-murder has no express basis in the
Penal Code," evidence exists that the 1872 legislature intended to codify
the second degree felony-murder rule in section 189. The existence
of legislative intent to codify the second degree felony-murder rule
in section 189 establishes the statutory basis for the doctrine28 despite
the absence of express language concerning the second degree felony-
murder rule in that statute. The felony-murder rule was held con-
stitutional in Dillon,29 therefore, the separation of powers barrier which
precluded judicial abrogation of the first degree felony-murder rule
in Dillon3" similarly should preclude judicial abolition of the second
degree felony-murder rule." People v. Phillips, cited by the Dillon
court in support of the dictum that the second degree felony-murder
rule is uncodified common law, will be shown to be authority only
for the narrow proposition that the rule has no express basis in the
Penal Code. 2 The question whether the 1872 legislature intended to
codify the second degree felony-murder doctrine in section 189 was
not answered by Phillips,33 thereby rendering Phillips only partial
authority for the conclusion that the second degree felony-murder rule
has no statutory basis.3 ' As will be shown, the Dillon court did not
25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
26. See 34 Cal. 3d at 471-72, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715, 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
408, 408 n.19.
27. See Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232; accord 34
Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. 408 n.19.
28. A statute embodies that which the legislature intended for the statute to embody. See
Dickey v. Raisin Probation Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 508 (1944); accord
California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal. 2d 43, 53, 251 P.2d 4, 9 (1952). See also
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono Co., 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d
1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972)(citing In re Application of Haines, 195 Cal. 605,
613, 234 P. 883, 886 (1925)).
29. 34 Cal. 3d at 476, 66& P.2d at 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 411. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31.. See supra note 16.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 151-61.
33. 64 Cal. 2d at 582-84, 414 P.2d at 360-61, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33. See infra text ac-
companying notes 151-63. See generally note 22 supra and accompanying text.
34. The court in Dillon may have recognized that Phillips is only partial authority for
the conclusion that the second degree felony-murder rule is uncodified. The court was careful
to characterize second degree felony-murder as having no express basis in the Penal Code,
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rely upon the express language of section 189 when holding that the
first degree felony-murder rule is embodied in that statute." Only
after an argument of inferences drawn from sources apart from the
express language of section 189 was accepted did the supreme court
hold that the 1872 legislature intended to codify the felony-murder
rule for the felonies listed in section 189.36 Express language codify-
ig the second degree felony-murder rule in section 189 similarly should
be unnecessary to prove that the rule is codified if evidence of
legislative intent to codify the second degree felony-murder doctrine
can be established.37 That evidence is provided by the arguments made
in Dillon [hereinafter cited as the Dillon analysis].
The Dillon analysis is comprised of the same evidence accepted by
the supreme court in Dillon when holding that the 1872 legislature
intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule in section 189.38
The Dillon analysis includes portions of the explanatory notes to sec-
tions 189, 192 and 455 of the original 1872 Penal Code offered by
the drafters of that code [the drafters hereinafter cited as the Code
Commission]." Evidence of legislative intent to codify the second
degree felony-murder rule also is provided by the negative pregnant
4
construction of the involuntary manslaughter statute of the Penal Code,
section 192. In the aggregate, this evidence forms an argument as
apparently reserving judgment on whether any basis exists in the Penal Code for the doctrine.
34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
36. "We recognize from the standpoint of consistency the outcome of [the Dillon deci-
sion] leaves much to be desired...we [hold the first degree felony-murder rule to be codified]
only by piling inference on inference..." 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
37. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 253.
39. This comment addresses the question whether the legislature intended to codify the
second degree felony-murder rule. As in Dillon evidence of legislative intent is provided by
the explanatory notes accompanying the original Penal Code drafted by the California Code
Commission. Compare 34 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 467-71, 668 P.2d at 710, 712-15, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 403, 405-08 with infra text accompanying notes 171-91, 218-23, 245-53. "When a statute
proposed by the California Code Commission for inclusion in the Penal Code of 1872 has
been enacted by the Legislature without substantial change, the report of the commission is
entitled to great weight in construing the statute and in determining the intent of the Legislature."
People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 171, 554 P.2d 881, 885, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139 (1976),
cited in 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
40. The construction of Penal Code Section 192 was characterized as a "negative pregnant"
by the Attorney General arguing for the State of California in Dillon. Seeking to prove that
the 1872 legislature intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule, the Attorney General
offered this construction as evidence of legislative intent to provide for the rule in a statute
other than section 192. The term "negative pregnant" describes the manner in which section
192 is defined in terms of conduct the statute does not proscribe, thereby creating the inference
that another statute does prohibit the conduct not covered under section 192. See 34 Cal. 2d
at 470, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07. See also text infra accompanying notes
134-39, 192-97.
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persuasive as the argument accepted by the supreme court in Dillon
that the 1872 legislature intended to codify the second degree felony-
murder rule in section 189.41 The Dillon court, however, did not find
that the evidence presented established a statutory basis for the sec-
ond degree felony-murder rule. Significantly, the court emphasized
that the listing of felonies in section 189 limited the intent of the
legislature to codify the felony-murder rule.4" Only felonies capable
of supporting a first degree felony-murder conviction are listed in sec-
tion 189; 41 consequently, the holding in Dillon is limited to a finding
that the legislature intended to codify the first degree felony-murder
rule." Accordingly, the second degree felony-murder rule was
characterized by the Dillon court as "judge-made law without any
express basis in the Penal Code. ' '45 This characterization of the sec-
ond degree felony-murder rule appears based upon the unsupported
conclusion that the listing of felonies in section 189 is indicative of
legislative intent to limit the codification of the felony-murder rule. 6
As will be shown, no evidence exists to suggest that the enumeration
of felonies in section 189 was intended by the 1872 legislature to limit
the codification of the felony-murder rule by that statute.47 Conse-
quently, the evidence developed in Dillon, as applied by this author
in the Dillon analysis, strongly suggests that the 1872 legislature in-
tended to codify the second degree felony-murder rule in section 189.
This conclusion will be supported by a full discussion of the four
components of the Dillon analysis48 after close examination of the
Dillon decision. 49 To establish a foundation upon which to build the
Dillon analysis, however, two facts about the felony-murder rule as
applied in California should be understood.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 171-253.
42. See 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
44. 34 Cal. 3d at 471-72, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
45. Id. at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
46. As will be shown, the Dillon analysis provides strong evidence that the 1872 legislature
intended to codify the second degree felony-murder rule. See infra text accompanying notes
171-253. The Dillon analysis is based on proof almost identical to that accepted in Dillon.
See infra note 253. The court has not passed on the issue whether the second degree felony-
murder rule is codified. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. With evidence before the
court suggesting that the second degree felony-murder rule was intended to be codified and
the question unresolved whether the rule is statutory, the reason the court chose to characterize
the rule as "judge-made law" remains open to speculation. From the language of the Dillon
decision, one answer appears to be that the court felt only those felonies listed in section 189
were intended by the 1872 legislature to trigger application of the felony-murder rule. See 34
Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 230-43.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 171-253.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 75-151.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
FELONY-MURDER As APPLIED IN CALIFORNIA
Underlying any discussion of the felony-murder rule is the seminal
fact that malice aforethought, a statutory element of murder in
California,50 need not be proved in a prosecution for murder pre-
mised on the theory of felony-murder. 5' In California, malice is con-
clusively presumed to have attended a killing proximately caused by
the commission or attempt to commit a felony52 enumerated in sec-
tion 189,13 or a felony inherently dangerous to human life.54 Although
the existence of malice aforethought to a killing typically distinguishes
murder from less culpable forms of homicide," the felony-murder
rule operates as an exception 6 and authorizes a defendant in Califor-
nia to be convicted of murder even though his act of killing was com-
pletely accidental."7 This imbalance between the criminality of a defen-
dant charged with felony-murder and his moral culpability has been
the catalyst for most of the criticism leveled at the felony-murder
doctrine. 58
50. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or fetus, with malice aforethought."
CAL. PENAL CODE §187.
51. See People v. Avalos, 98 Cal. App. 3d 701, 718, 159 Cal. Rptr. 736, 745 (1979), cited
with approval in 34 Cal. 3d at 475, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
52. See 34 Cal. 3d at 474-75, 668 P.2d at 717-18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. See generally
2F. WHARTON, CusnlAL LAW, §145 at 204 (14th ed.). The felony-murder rule relieves the
burden upon the prosecution to prove a killing was accompanied by malice by force of the
conclusive presumption of malice aforethought attached to the commission of the felony under-
lying the killing. Id. Compare PERKINS, CRumNAL LAv" 71 (3d ed. 1982)(characterizing the in-
tent to commit a felony as malice aforethought).
53. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
54. See Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 458 n.5, 406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5;
accord, Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232; People v. Mattison,
4 Cal. 3d 177, 184, 481 P.2d 193, 198, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 (1971). See also People v.
Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 149, 330 P.2d 763, 767 (1958).
55. The existence of malice aforethought to the killing is the "grand criterion" which
distinguishes murder from other forms of homicide. BLAcKsToan, Co,MANTARIs 198 (Ham-
mond, ed. 1898).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. "In every case of murder other than felony-
murder the prosecution undoubtedly has the burden of proving malice as an element of the
crime." 34 Cal. 3d dt 475, 668 P.2d at 717, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 410. "The issue of malice
is...'wholly immaterial for the purposes of the proponent's case' when the charge is felony-
murder." 34 Cal. 3d at 475, 668 P.2d at 717, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 410. "[T]he only criminal
intent required [to be proved in the prosecution of felony-murder] is the specific intent to com-
mit the particular felony." People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 688, 504 P.2d 1256, 1266-67,
105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 802-03 (1973) (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel, 25
Cal. 3d 668, 685 n.12, 603 P.2d 1, 10 n.12, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 93 n.12 (1979)).
57. See People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 135-36, 169 P.2d 1, 10 (1946); People v.
Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 791, 161 P.2d 227, 232 (1945); People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d
203, 210, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (1969).
58. "It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent, or reckless homicide
into a murder simply because, without more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objec-
tive of some defined class." 7A HAWAII Rav. STAT., §§707-801, commentary, p.347. "The
most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates [the] basic principle [that
criminal liability is not justified in the absence of proportionate criminal culpability]." People
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Of further importance to a discussion of felony-murder in Califor-
nia is the difference between the way in which first and second degree
felony-murder is determined. Section 189 lists six felonies that alone
may support a first degree felony-murder conviction. 9 These felonies
are rape, robbery, arson, burglary, mayhem, and lewd or lacivious
acts with a minor under fourteen.6" A killing without malice, prox-
imately caused by the attempt or commission of any other felony can
be, at most, second degree felony-murder in California.6 1 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has imposed the additional limitation that the
underlying felony be inherently dangerous to human life. 62 The court
has declared the following felonies to be inherently dangerous to human
life: administering of narcotics to a minor,63 administering of poison,64
abortion, 6 drunk driving, 66 kidnapping, 67 and the willful burning of
a motor vehicle. 68 The California Appellate Courts additionally have
v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 317 (1980). "The modem tendency has been to oppose policy-
formation such as that embodied in or extended from the felony-murder doctrine. It has in-
sisted on a decent regard for the facts and on sanctions that represent fair evaluation of these
facts and not on the supposed character of the offender." HAu, GENmuL Pmcns.ES OF CpRIMNAL
LAv 455 (1947). Cf. notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text (criticisms of the felony-murder
doctrine).
59. Penal Code Section 189 enumerates certain circumstances that distinguish first degree
from second degree murder. The statute acts as a degree-setting device for murder, setting
at first degree those murders attended by the circumstances listed in the statute. 34 Cal. 3d
at 465, 668 P.2d at 710, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403. See also Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 182, 481
P.2d at 196, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 188. "[A]ll other kinds of murder are of the second degree."
CAL. PENAL CODE §189.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE §189.
61. See People v. Romo, 47 Cal. App. 3d 976, 989, 121 Cal. Rptr. 684, 692 (1975). See
also People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d 892, 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635
(1964)(distinguishing first degree from second degree felony-murder); People v. Milton, 145
Cal. 169, 171-72, 78 P. 549, 550 (1904)(interpreting Penal Code Section 189 as implicated upon
the commission of the felonies enumerated in the statute, and every felony known to the law).
62. This limitation was imposed in recognition of the deterrence rationale behind the felony-
murder doctrine which is premised on the assumption that a felon will be less likely to kill
during the commission of a felony knowing that, as a result, a murder sanction will be im-
posed. "[This deterrence rationale] may be well served with respect to felonies such as robbery
or burglary, but it has little relevance to a felony which is not inherently dangerous. If the
felony is not inherently dangerous it is highly improbable that the potential felon will be deter-
red. He will not anticipate that an injury or death might arise solely from the fact that he
will commit the felony." Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 457 n.4, 406 P.2d at 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rptr.
at 10 n.4. See also Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 50, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
63. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d at 149, 330 P.2d at 767.
64. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 184, 481 P.2d at 199, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
65. People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196, 205, 208 P.2d 974, 979-80 (1949); Wright, 167 Cal.
at 5, 138 P. at 351; People v. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259, 265, 76 P. 1017, 1020 (1904).
66. People v. McIntyre, 213 Cal. 50, 56, 1 P.2d 443, 445 (1931). The California appellate
courts have extended the rationale of McIntyre to find driving while under the influence of
narcotics to be an inherently dangerous felony. See People v. Calzada, 13 Cal. App. 3d 603,
606, 91 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1970).
67. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d at 795, 388 P.2d at 907-08, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36 (1964).
68. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150, 162, 474 P.2d 673, 681, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (1970).
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held the practicing of medicine without a license,69 the administering
and furnishing of narcotics, 70 and automobile theft7' to be inherently
dangerous felonies. These crimes may support a second degree felony-
murder conviction. For purposes of this comment, the important
distinction to be made between first and second degree felony-murder
is that those felonies capable of supporting a first degree felony-murder
conviction have been listed by the legislature in section 189. In mark-
ed contrast, those felonies capable of supporting a second degree
felony-murder conviction have been recognized by judicial decision.7 2
One reason for this discrepancy is the lack of language in section
189 concerning any particular form of second degree murder." The
legislature has grouped in section 189 all forms of second degree
murder in one catch-all phrase "...and all other kinds of murders
are of the second degree." 7 The significance of the omission from
the Penal Code of language concerning particular forms of second
degree murder is examined later in this comment when the Dillon
analysis is applied to evidence legislative intent to codify the second
degree felony-murder rule in section 189. For present purposes,
understanding these threshold concepts underlying the felony-murder
rule as applied in California will aid comprehension of the issues and
arguments presented in Dillon which will be combined later by this
author to suggest that the second degree felony-murder rule is codified
in section 189.
People v. Dillon
The primary issue in Dillon was whether the court could abolish
the first degree felony-murder rule.7" The Dillon court noted that the
ability of a California court to abrogate a law depends upon the origin
of the law. 76 If a law is promulgated by the legislature, it may be
69. People v. Burroughs, 141 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392, 190 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307-08 (1983),
hearing granted June 23, 1983, Crim. 23125.
70. People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314, 334 (1973); People
v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 333-34, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 463 (1969); People v. Taylor, 11
Cal. App. 3d 57, 64, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702 (1970).
71. People v. Pulley, 225 Cal. App. 2d 366, 373, 37 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (1964)(disapproved
on other grounds in Williams. 63 Cal. 2d at 458 n.5, 406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5).
72. Lovato, 258 Cal. App. 2d at 292, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 640. See generally notes 63-72
and accompanying text (California decisions upholding second degree felony-murder convic-
tions for felonies not listed in Penal Code Section 189).
73. See supra note 59. See also Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 S.W.U.L. REv.
413, 421 (1981); Pike, What is Second Degree Murder in California?, 9 So. CAL. L. REv.
112, 118 (1936).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE §189. See also Fletcher, supra note 73 at 421.
75. 34 Cal. 3d at 462-72, 668 P.2d at 708-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401-08.
76. Id. at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402. See generally notes 6, 11, and
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abolished judicially only if found unconstitutional." If, on the other
hand, the law is judge-made, it is abolishable at the discretion of
the court.78 The defendant in Dillon contended that the first degree
felony-murder rule was judge-made law in California and, therefore,
judicially abolishable."1 The Attorney General, representing the State
of California, argued that the legislature had intended to codify the
first degree felony-murder rule in section 189 and, as a result, the
court was precluded from abrogating the rule.80 To settle the ques-
tion, the court thoroughly examined the legislative history of section
189.81' As will be shown, the examination produced conflicting evidence.
The supreme court noted in Dillon that the structure of section
189 has not changed since the enactment of the statute in 1872.82
As originally promulgated, the statute provided:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder
of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the second
degree.8 1
In support of the position advocated by the defendant that the first
degree felony-murder rule was not intended to be codified in section
189, the Dillon court noted" that the Code Commission, in its note
accompanying section 189,85 explained that the section was adopted
from a 1794 Pennsylvania statute acknowledged as the first legisla-
tion in the nation dividing the crime of murder into two degrees.86
16 supra and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 11 and 16 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
79. 34 Cal. 3d at 462, 668 P.2d at 708, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
80. Id. at 468-71, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08.
81. Id. at 463-72, 668 P.2d at 709-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402-08.
82. Id. at 467 n.14, 668 P.2d at 712 n.14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405 n.14. Penal Code Section
189 has been amended several times since its enactment to include additional circumstances
of murder to which first degree punishment will attach. See 1873-74 CAL. CODE AamD., c.614,
§16, at 427 (adding the crime of mayhem); 1949 Cal. Stat., c.16 §1, at 30 (first ex. sess.)(ad-
ding the crime of child molesting); 1970 Cal. Stat., c.771, §3, at 1456 (substituted "destructive
device" for "bomb"); 1981 Cal Stat., c.404, §7, at 1593 (further defined "deliberate and
premeditated"); 1982 Cal. Stat., c.949, §1, at 5039 (added "knowing use of ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor"). The statute has not been amended to clarify the func-
tion of the statute. 34 Cal. 3d at 467 n.14, 668 P.2d at 712 n.14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405 n.14.
83. CAL. PENAL CODE §189 (1872).
84. 34 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 668 P.2d at 710, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
85. CAL. PENAL CoDE ANN. §189 Code Com. note (1872).
86. 34 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 668 P.2d at 710, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403. See generally 4 Jou~RAL
oF TH SENATE 242 (Pa. 1794)(enactment of the 1794 Pennsylvania statute); PEmRaNs, supra
note 52 at 137; 34 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402. Cf. Keedy,
History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 759,
771-73 (1949)(discussing the enactment of the statute).
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The Dillon court noted that the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted
the 1794 statute solely as a degree-setting device for murder, and not
as a codification of the felony-murder rule.8 7 Under this interpreta-
tion, murder must be proven first, independent of the degree-setting
statute.8 Only after murder is proven independently may the degree-
setting statute be employed to determine the degree of the murder. 9
In other words, once murder is established by proof that an unlawful
killing with malice aforethought has occurred, 90 the court will refer
to the degree-setting statute to determine if any of the circumstances
listed in the statute attended the murder.9' If one of the circumstances
listed did attend the murder, the statute declares the murder to be
of the first degree. 92 If none of the enumerated circumstances attended
the murder, the statute declares the murder to be of the second
degree.93 The defendant in Dillon argued that because section 189 had
been modeled after the Pennsylvania degree-setting statute, the
legislature must have intended section 189 to operate as a degree-setting
device for murder and not as a codification of the first degree felony-
murder rule. 94 This assertion was strengthened when the supreme court
further examined the legislative history of section 189. 91
The court explained in Dillon that section 189 was adopted from
section 21 of the first codification of the criminal law in California,
"An Act concerning Crimes and Punishments, '9 6 enacted in 1850
[hereinafter cited as the 1850 Act]. Penal Code section 189, as enacted
in 1872, was nearly identical to section 21 of the 1850 Act as amended
in 1856. 7 If a murder was found to have been committed by certain
87. 34 Cal. 3d at 464 n.9, 668 P.2d at 709 n.9, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.9. See Com-
monwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d. 472, 476 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. Meyers,
261 A.2d 550, 553 (1970).
88. "[WMhen a murder is otherwise proved-to wit, an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought-the statute simply fixes the degree thereof." 34 Cal. 3d at 464, 668 P.2d at
709i 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (the California Supreme Court interpreting the Michigan Supreme
Court interpretation of the Michigan statute based on the 1794 Pennsylvania statute).
89. "Clearly this statutory felony-murder rule merely serves to raise the degree of certain
murders to first degree; it gives no aid to the determination of what constitutes murder in
the first place." Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. Meyers, 261 A.2d 550 (1970)(excerpt from
a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which the 1794 Pennsylvania statute was interpreted).
90. "At common law and traditionally in the United States murder is homicide committed
with malice aforethought." PEaRKNs, supra note 52, at 57. See CAL. PENAL CODE §187.
91. See 34 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 668 P.2d at 709-10, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 463, 668 P.2d at 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (the California Supreme Court
paraphrasing the discussion of the Michigan statute based on the 1794 Pennsylvania statute
by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321-23).
94. Id. at 462-63, 668 P.2d at 708-09, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
95. Id. at 464-68, 668 P.2d at 710-13, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403-06.
96. Id. at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
97. The only variances were grammatical. Id.
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enumerated means, or if the killing were willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, or if the murder occurred during the attempt or com-
mission of certain listed felonies, amended section 21 declared the
murder to be of the first degree. 98 All other murders were declared
by the statute to be of the second degree. 99 Amended section 21 was
interpreted by the supreme court in 1857 as a degree-setting device
for murder and not as a codification of the crime of murder in any
form.' The Code Commission expressly stated in the explanatory
note to section 189 that that section was based on section 21 of the
Crimes and Punishments Act as amended in 1856 and that no material
change in the language of section 21 was intended. 101 The Dillon court
drew the inference that because section 189 was based on section 21
as amended in 1856 with no material change in the language intended,
section 189 could be interpreted as amended section 21 had been in-
terpreted: solely as a degree-setting device for murder. 2 The Dillon
court rejected the argument that in 1856 section 21 embodied the
felony-murder rule because the rule, the court observed, had been
codified separately by the legislature in section 25 of the 1850 Act.1
0 3
Section 25 was one of four provisions in the 1850 Act relating to
the crime of manslaughter.0 4 One function of section 25 was to declare
as murder a homicide that otherwise would normally constitute no
more than manslaughter if committed "in the prosecution of a
felonious intent."'0 5 In this manner, section 25, acting as a proviso
to the manslaughter provisions of the 1850 Act, codified the entire
felony-murder rule. 0 6 Prior to the enactment of the present Penal
98. Amended section 21 provided in pertinent part:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture,
or by any other kind of wilfull, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery
or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder of the second degree.
1856 Cal. Stat., c.139, §2, at 219 (amending section 21 of the 1850 "Act concerning Crimes
and Punishments").
99. Id.
100. People v. Moore, 8 Cal. 90, 93 (1857); People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389, 393-99 (1861).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872). See 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668
P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
102. 34 Cal. 3d at 467-68, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
103. Id. at 470, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
104. 1850 Cal. Stat., c. 99, §§22-25, at 231 (defining the crime of manslaughter).
105. Section 25 provided in pertinent part: "Provided, that where such involuntary [sic]
killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which...is committed in the prosecu-
tion of a felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged murder." 1850 Cal. Stat.,
c.99, §25, at 220 (codifying the felony-murder rule).
106. See People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85, 94 (1872); accord, People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122,
124-27 (1889); 34 Cal. 3d at 466, 668 P.2d at 711, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 404. Death proximately
caused by the attempt or commission of any felony would have supported a felony-murder
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Code in 1872, therefore, section 25 and amended section 21 of the
1850 Act worked in tandem. If a person were killed as a result of
the commission or attempt to commit a felony, section 25 declared
the killing to be murder.'07 If the felony were one of those listed
in amended section 21, the murder was declared to be of the first
degree. 108 Death resulting from an attempt or commission of a felony
not listed in section 21 was held to be murder in the second degree.' 0 9
As the court noted in Dillon, however, this functioning of the law
of homicide in California changed with the enactment of the Penal
Code in 1872.110
All existing criminal law, including sections 21 and 25 of the 1850
Act, was repealed with the enactment of the 1872 Penal Code."' Much
of the 1850 Act was adopted in the new Penal Code without change,
including, as mentioned, section 21, which reappeared as section 189."2
The Dillon court observed that the felony-murder language of sec-
tion 25 of the 1850 Act was not reproduced in any Penal Code
provision."' From the deletion of the felony-murder language of sec-
tion 25 from the 1872 Penal Code, the Dillon court acknowledged
that the legislature apparently intended to make a substantial change
in the law and, consequently, implied an intent to abolish the use
of the felony-murder rule in California."41 Section 189 could not be
said to embody the crime of felony-murder if the legislature intended
to abolish the rule upon enactment of the Penal Code."'
The final inference drawn by the Dillon court in support of the
eventually rejected argument advanced by the defendant that section
189 was not intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule
originated from the language of section 189. Section 189 declares
"murder""116 committed under certain circumstances to be of the first
conviction under section 25. Id. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
107. 34 Cal. 3d at 466, 668 P.2d at 711, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
108. See Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94-95; Olsen, 80 Cal. at 124-27; 34 Cal. 3d at 466-67, 668
P.2d at 711-12, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
109. Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94-95; accord, 34 Cal. 3d at 465-67, 668 P.2d at 711-12, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 404- 05.
110. 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
111. CAL. PENAL CODE §6 (reserving exclusive authority to the Penal Code to declare an
act illegal and to prescribe criminal punishment). See 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872). See 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668
P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405. See also supra notes 96-97, 101 and accompanying text.
113. 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
114. Id.
115. "It is the cardinal rule that statutes are construed according to the intention, or at
least according to the apparent or evident intention or purpose, of the law makers." Dickey
v. Raisin Probation Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 508, (1944).
116. Although the express language of section 189 includes the term "murder," the supreme
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degree. In 1872, section 187 defined "murder" as the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being with malice aforethought." 7 Consequently, the
Dillon court hypothesized that because a term defined by a statute
is ordinarily binding on the courts," 8 section 189 would seem to re-
quire a killing to have occurred with malice aforethought before the
provisions of that statute could operate.'"' Section 189, interpreted
in this manner, could not codify the felony-murder rule, but would
act solely as a degree-setting device for murder.' 20 This court-drawn
inference, together with those previously discussed, combined to form
a compelling argument that the first degree felony-murder rule was
not intended to be codified in the Penal Code and, therefore, was
judicially abolishable.' 2' The Attorney General, however, successfully
argued for the opposite conclusion, that the supreme court was pre-
cluded from abolishing the first degree felony-murder doctrine because
the legislature intended to codify the rule in section 189.'22
PENAL. CODE SECTION 189 CoDIEs FIRST DEGREE FELONY-MURDER
The argument presented by the Attorney General was threefold.
The first component involved the Code Commission note accompa-
nying Penal Code section 189123 wherein an excerpt from the supreme
court opinion of People v. Sanchez'24 was quoted with approval.'25
The excerpt included a discussion of how to administer the degree-
setting function of amended section 21 of the 1850 Act. 26 The San-
court often has required no more than a "killing" when invoking the proscriptions of that
statute. See Note, California Rewrites Felony-Murder Rule, 18 STAN. L.R. 690 (1966).
117. CAL. PENAL CODE §187 (1872). The statute was amended in 1970 to include within
the definition of murder the killing of a fetus with malice aforethought. 1970 Cal. Stat., c.
1311, §1, at 2440.
118. Great Lake Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo, 19 Cal. 3d 152, 156, 561 P.2d
244, 246, 137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156 (1977); People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621,
638, 268 P.2d 723, 733 (1954), cited with approval in 34 Cal. 3d at 468, 66B P.2d at 712,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
119. 34 Cal. 3d at 468, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. "at 405.
120. "It must be emphasized, however, that a killing by one of the means enumerated in
[section 189] is not murder of the first degree unless it is first established that it is
murder.. .Without a showing of malice, it is immaterial that the killing was perpetrated by one
of the means enumerated in [section 189]." (emphasis in original). Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 182,
481 P.2d at 196, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 188, cited in 34 Cal. 3d at 465 n.11, 668 P.2d at 710 n.11,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 403 n.11. Cf. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 322 (1980) (describing
the Michigan first degree murder statute as solely a degree-setting device for murder); Com-
monwealth ex rel Smith v. Meyers, 261 A.2d 550 (1970)(describing the 1794 Pennsylvania statute
as solely a degree-setting device for murder).
121. 34 Cal. 3d at 464-68, 668 P.2d at 710-13, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 403-06.
122. Id. at 468-71, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08.
123. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872).
124. 24 Cal. 17, 29-30 (1864).
125. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872).
126. "Since the enactment [of the 1794 Pennsylvania statute, of which section 189 is a
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chez excerpt was included by the Code Commission in the explanatory
note to section 189 to explain the degree-setting function of that
statute.'27 The Attorney General, however, argued that the Sanchez
excerpt also evidenced a belief by the Code Commission that section
189 codified the first degree felony-murder rule. The Attorney General
emphasized the language of the Sanchez excerpt "where the killing
is done in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate some one of the
felonies enumerated in [amended section 21] ... the jury have no op-
tion but to find the prisoner guilty [of murder] in the first degree"
(emphasis added). 29 The substitution of the word "killing" for
"murder" may have been construed by the Code Commission as
evidence that amended section 21 codified the first degree felony-
murder rule. 3 ' The inclusion of the Sanchez excerpt in the explanatory
note to section 189, therefore, evidenced a belief by the Code Com-
mission that section 189 continued to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule.' 3 ' No evidence was presented by the Attorney General
to suggest that the Code Commission actually interpreted the San-
chez excerpt as indicating that amended section 21 codified the first
degree felony-murder rule.'32 Nonetheless, the court accepted the San-
chez excerpt as evidence of a belief by the Code Commission that
section 189 embodied the first degree felony-murder rule. 33
The second component of the argument made by the Attorney
General in Dillon centered upon the language of section 192 which
defines the crime of involuntary manslaughter. 3 " Section 192 pro-
vides: "[Involuntary Manslaughter is the] unlawful killing of a human
being, without malice.. .in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony" (emphasis added).'35 The Attorney General
copy], no subject has been the source of more patient judicial investigation than the distinction
between the two degrees of murder ...After all that had been written upon this topic, it re-
mained for the Supreme Court of [California] to be the first to draw the distinction between
the two degrees of murder... [See] The People v. Vincente Sanchez, 24 Cal., p.29..." Id. See
34 Cal. 3d at 469, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
127. CA. PENA CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872). See supra note 126 and accom-
panying text.
128. 34 Cal. 3d at 469, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
129. Id.
130. Id. Compare supra note 116.
131. 34 Cal. 3d at 469, 471, 668 P.2d at 713, 714- 15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408.
132. The Attorney General relied solely upon the language of the Sanchez opinion included
in the Code Commission note to Penal Code Section 189 and hypothesized that the Commis-
sion had interpreted that language as depicting amended section 21 as embodying the felony-
murder rule. 34 Cal. 3d at 468-69, 471, 668 P.2d at 713, 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408.
133. Id. at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
134. Id. at 469-70, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
135. Section 192, as enacted in 1872, provided:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of two
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argued that the qualifying language of the manslaughter statute "not
amounting to a felony" should be read as a negative pregnant.' 3 6 The
language arguably implies that somewhere in the Penal Code the
legislature intended to codify the felony-murder rule by making criminal
the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, in the com-
mission of a felony.'37 The supreme court termed the inference "not
unreasonable,"' 38 but indicated that the burden remain upon the At-
torney General to show which statute was believed by the Code Com-
mission to codify the felony-murder rule.' 39
The required evidence, the third component of the argument made
by the Attorney General in Dillon was found in the explanatory note
accompanying section 455,140 relating to the crime of arson. The note
first explains that the nine sections of the present Penal Code per-
taining to arson were based on sections 4 through 6 of the repealed
1850 Act."' Section 5 of the repealed 1850 Act codified arson felony-
murder by declaring any death occurring as a result of arson to be
murder.' 42 This clause was not adopted into the arson sections of the
present Penal Code. The note explains the omission as intentional,
characterizing the language as "surplusage, for the killing in the case
is in the perpetration of arson, and falls within the definition of murder
in the first degree. -See section 189, ante"'' 43 (emphasis added). The
Attorney General argued that the deletion of the felony-murder
language from the arson sections of the Penal Code evidenced that
the Code Commission believed that section 189 codified arson felony-
kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony;
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection.
Id.
136. 34 Cal. 3d at 470, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The inference drawn from the negative pregnant construction of Penal Code Sec-
tion 192 suggested that the Code Commission had intended to provide for a felony-murder
rule in another statute, but did not suggest which statute that was. Id. The Sanchez excerpt
offered by the Attorney General as evidence of a Code Commission belief that Penal Code
Section 139 embodied the felony-murder rule was inadequate evidence of which statute was believed
by the Code Commission to codify the felony-murder rule because the supreme court previous-
ly had rejected Sanchez as direct evdience that section 189 codified the doctrine. Id. at 469,
668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406. Only after other evidence had been provided by the
Attorney General to suggest that the Code Commission intended to provide for the first degree
felony-murder rule in section 189 was the Sanchez excerpt accepted by the court as evidence
in support of that proposition. Id. at 471, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §455, Code Com. note (1872).
141. Id.
142. 1856 Cal. Stat., c. 110, §5, at 132 (defining arson).
143. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §455, Code Com. note (1872).
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murder because that language duplicated the function of section 189.'"
Combined with the prior inferences presented by the Attorney General
which suggested that the Code Commission intended to codify the
first degree felony-murder rule somewhere in the Penal Code, this
evidence supported the inference that the doctrine was codified in sec-
tion 189.'11
Acknowledging the decision to be a close call, the supreme court
sided with the Attorney General, holding that section 189 codifies
the first degree felony-murder rule.1 6 The court came to this conclu-
sion because evidence had been provided from collateral sources that
indicated legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-murder
rule in that statute.'"7 The express language of section 189 was not
considered by the court in reaching its holding.' 48 The court, in fact,
rejected the language of section 189 as determinative of legislative
intent to codify the doctrine.' 4 9 Nonetheless, the Dillon court empha-
sized the absence of express language in the Penal Code concerning
second degree felony-murder when declaring in dictum, that the sec-
ond degree felony-murder rule is uncodified common law."0 The court
cited People v. Phillips as the authority for this characterization of
the second degree felony-murder doctrine."' As will be shown,
however, People v. Phillips is authority only for the proposition that
the second degree felony-murder rule has no express basis in the Penal
Code. Phillips is not dispositive of the issue whether the second degree
felony-murder rule was intended to be codified in the Penal Code.
144. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 472, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
147. The collateral sources had been the Sanchez opinion excerpt included in the Code Com-
mission note to Penal Code Section 189, the negative pregnant construction of Penal Code
Section 192, and the Code Commission note to Penal Code Section 455. No other evidence
of legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-murder rule in Penal Code Section 189
was provided by the Attorney General. 34 Cal. 3d at 468-71, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 406-08. "[T]he evidence of present legislative intent thus identified by the Attorney
General is sufficient... [to require the court] to construe section 189 as a statutory enactment
of the first degree felony-murder rule in California." (emphasis added). Id. at 472, 668 P.2d
at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
148. Id. at 468-71, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
149. The supreme court acknowledged that section 189 was based on amended section 21
of the 1856 "Act concerning Crimes and Punishments" and that the language of the two statutes
were nearly identical. 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405. See supra
text accompanying notes 96-97. The language of amended section 21 was expressly rejected
by the Dillon court as codifying the crime of felony-murder. Id. at 469, 471, 668 P.2d at
713, 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408. No material change in the language of amended sec-
tion 21 was intended upon enactment of section 189. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com.
note (1872). See 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
150. 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
151. Id.
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As a result, an argument can be made that is very similar to the one
accepted by the court in Dillon when holding the first degree felony-
murder rule to be codified in section 189 that the 1872 legislature
also intended to codify the second degree felony-murder rule in sec-
tion 189.
People v. Phillips - NOT DisPosrrivE
The issue raised in Phillips was whether the second degree felony-
murder rule could be applied despite the lack of an express basis in
the Penal Code for the doctrine.' 52 The supreme court in Phillips
acknowledged that no express language codifying the second degree
felony murder-rule appears in the Penal Code, 153 but applied the rule
nonetheless, declaring that "the concept lies imbedded in [California]
law."' 154 The Phillips court cited People v. Williams'5 5 and People
v. Ford'56 as precedent for the holding that "the perpetration of some
felonies, exclusive of those enumerated in Penal Code section 189,
may provide the basis for a murder conviction under the felony-murder
rule.""' This is as far as the Phillips court delves into the issues
whether the second degree felony-murder rule is codified in the Penal
Code. No reason is offered by the court to explain why Williams
or Ford authorizes application of the second degree felony-murder
doctrine. 5 The Williams and Ford decisions also contain no
explanation. 59 In those cases the court, as in Phillips, relies upon
stare decisis as authority for applying the second degree felony-murder
rule. '6 Statutory authority authorizing application of the rule was
not cited.' 6'
152. 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
156. 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388 P.2d 892, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1964).
157. 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
158. The court appeared to rely on Williams and Ford as the latest precedent reaffirming
a history of decisions authorizing application of the second degree felony-murder rule. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
159. See Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 457, 406 P.2d at 649-50, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10; Ford,
60 Cal. 2d at 795, 388 P.2d at 907-08, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
160. In Williams, the supreme court quoted the formulation developed in Ford, "A homicide
that is a direct casual result of the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human
life (other than the six felonies enumerated in Penal Code §189) constitutes at least second
degree murder," as authority for applying the second degree felony-murder rule. 63 Cal. 2d
at 457, 406 P.2d at 649, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 9. In Ford, the court cited Poindexter, 51 Cal.
2d at 149, 330 P.2d at 767; Powell, 34 Cal. 2d at 205, 208 P.2d at 205; and People v. McIn-
tyre, 213 Cal. 50, 56, 1 P.2d 443, 445 as support for the formulation. 60 Cal. 2d at 705,
388 P.2d at 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
161. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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What is important to note about the Phillips, Williams, and Ford
cases, and every supreme court decision to date regarding the second
degree felony-murder rule, is the lack of judicial inquiry into whether
the legislature intended to codify the second degree felony-murder rule
in section 189.162 The inquiry has been unnecessary primarily because
the court has relied exclusively upon Phillips and similar cases that
authorize application of the second degree felony-murder rule without
concern for an express statutory basis for the doctrine." 3 As a conse-
quence, the issue of whether the legislature intended to codify the
second degree felony-murder doctrine in section 189 has not been
decided by the supreme court. That issue must be decided before
judicial abrogation of the second degree felony-murder rule can oc-
cur because legislative intent to codify the doctrine will prevent judicial
abolition of the rule.'64 This is the teaching of Dillon. In that case,
no express statutory language was accepted by the court as directly
codifying the first degree felony-murder rule, yet proof of legislative
intent to codify the doctrine prevented the court from abolishing the
rule. 65 If a similar legislative intent to codify the second degree felony-
murder rule in the Penal Code can be proved, the court seemingly
will be precluded from abrogating the doctrine by the same separa-
tion of powers barrier that blocked court abolition of the first degree
felony-murder rule in Dillon.16 6 Evidence of legislative intent to codify
the second degree felony-murder rule in section 189 is provided by
the Dillon analysis.
THE Dillon ANALYSIS-THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY SECOND
DEGREE FELONY-MURDER RULE
The Dillon analysis is comprised of four components.The first is
the excerpt from the Sanchez opinion reproduced in the explanatory
162. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 159,
163, 474 P.2d 673, 681, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (1970)(citing Ford). The second degree felony-
murder rule may be applied regardless of express statutory authorization for the doctrine in
the capacity as a common-law determinant of the malice aforethought element of murder im-
posed by Penal Code section 187. See generally LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 7, at 528 (listing
the felony-murder doctrine as a species of malice recognized at common law and as existing
in most American jurisdictions); PERKINS, supra note 52, at 58-72 (same); CAL. PNAL CODE
§188 (defining the term "malice" as used in Penal Code section 187).
164. See supra notes 11 and 16 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of a statutory
felony-murder rule was determined in Dillon. 34 Cal. 3d at 476, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 411.
165. 34 Cal. 3d at 463, 472, 668 P.2d at 709, 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 408.
166. Id. See supra notes 11, 16 and 164 and accompanying text.
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note to section 189.167 The second is the negative pregnant construc-
tion of the present manslaughter statute, section 192.168 The explanatory
note to section 192 in which section 25 of the 1850 Act is credited
as embodied in the present manslaughter statute 169 serves as the third
component of the Dillon analysis. The fourth is the explanatory note
to the arson statute, section 455,170 in which section 189 is characterized
as codifying arson felony-murder. Each component evidences an in-
tent by the 1872 Code Commission to codify some degree of the felony-
murder rule in the 1872 Penal Code. In the aggregate, the components
combine to form a persuasive argument that second degree felony-
murder was intended to be codified in Penal code section 189.
The first component of the Dillon analysis, the Sanchez opinion
excerpt, was accepted by the court in Dillon as evidence that the Code
Commission believed section 189 to embody the first degree felony-
murder rule. 171 The same excerpt contains evidence that the Code Com-
mission believed section 189 also to embody the second degree felony-
murder rule. The Sanchez excerpt provided in part:
In dividing murder into two degrees, the legislature intended to assign
to the first, as deserving greater punishment, all murders of a cruel
and aggravated character; and to the second, all other kinds of
murder which are murder at common law;.. 172
The Fifth District Court of Appeal of California recently accepted
this language as evidence of an understanding by the 1872 legislature
that Penal Code section 189 codified the second degree felony-murder
rule. 173 In People v. Taylor,171 the defendant appealed from a con-
viction of second degree felony-murder in which the furnishing of
heroin was the underlying felony. The defendant made an argument
similar to the one made by the defendant in Dillon, positing that
his conviction for second degree felony-murder could not stand because
no statutory authority existed for the crime. 171 The prosecution
argued that section 189 embodied the second degree felony-murder
rule and offered as support the explanatory note to section 189, in-
167. CAL. PENAL CODE §189, Code Com. note (1872).
168. CAL. PENAL CoDE.§192. See 34 Cal. 3d at 469-70, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 406-07. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
169. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §192, Code Com. note (1872).
170. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §455, Code Com. note (1872).
171. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
172. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872).
173. People v. Taylor, 112 Cal. App. 3d 348, 356-57, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294-95 (1980).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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cluding the Sanchez excerpt quoted above.11 6 The appellate court in
Taylor held for the prosecution, stating that "[t]he Legislature in-
tended by Penal Code section 189 to define second degree murder
and to include therein felony- murder."' 7 The Taylor court noted
that one form of murder at common lav was second degree
felony-murder.' 78 Using this common-law knowledge as a proper source
of interpretation of the term "murder" found in Penal Code section
189,179 the Taylor court concluded that the legislature intended for
section 189 to embody second degree felony-murder.'80 The language
from the Sanchez excerpt "[second degree murder embodies] all other
kinds of murder which are murder at common law..." was quoted
by the court as support for the holding."'
Taylor appears to be the only reported case in which a California
court has passed on the issue whether the 1872 legislature intended
to codify second degree felony-murder in Penal Code section 189.112
The Taylor decision was denied certiorari by the California Supreme
Court;'13 therefore, Taylor is the leading authority on whether a Penal
Code basis exists for second degree felony-murder. 1 4 Taylor cannot
be considered strong authority for the proposition that Penal Code
section 189 codifies the second degree felony-murder rule, however.
Reliance by Taylor upon the Sanchez excerpt as direct evidence of
the way in which section 189 codifies the second degree felony-murder
doctrine is misplaced. In Dillon, the supreme court rejected the San-
chez excerpt as direct evidence that section 189 embodies the felony-
murder rule.' Only after the other prongs of the argument advanced
by the Attorney General in Dillon were established did the court ac-
cept the Sanchez excerpt as evidence of a Code Commission belief
that Penal Code section 189 codified the first degree felony-murder
rule. " The Dillon decision teaches, therefore, that the Sanchez ex-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 22 and 163 and accompanying text. See also supra note 158 and ac-
companying text.
183. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
184. Although the denial of a hearing by the supreme court of a lower court decision is
not necessarily an approval of that decision, the appellate decision is considered, nonetheless,
the leading authority on the issues therein decided to the extent that it does not conflict with
current supreme court holdings. See DiGenova v. State Board of Education, 57 Cal. 2d 167,
178, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1962); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal, 2d 345, 352,
289 P.2d 450, 453 (1955).
185. 34 Cal. 3d at 469, 471, 668 P.2d at 713, 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408,
186. Id. at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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cerpt cannot serve as direct evidence that section 189 codifies any
degree of the felony-murder rule, but the excerpt can serve as evidence
of a Code Commission belief that Penal Code section 189 codified
the first degree felony-murder rule. This author asserts, however, that
the Sanchez excerpt is capable of evidencing a Code Commission belief
that section 189 codified the second degree felony-murder rule.
The appellate court in Taylor has shown how the Sanchez excerpt
can be misconstrued as being direct evidence that section 189 em-
bodies the second degree felony-murder rule.' 87 The Code Commis-
sion possibly could have construed the Sanchez excerpt in the same
manner. Consequently, the Sanchez excerpt is evidence of a Code Com-
mission belief that section 189 codified the second degree felony-murder
rule despite that excerpt having been rejected as direct evidence of
the felony-murder rule being codified in section 189. In Dillon, the
court considered "immaterial" the misreading by the Code Commis-
sion of the Sanchez excerpt as direct evidence that the first degree
felony-murder rule was codified by section 189.188 This misreading
was accepted, however, as evidence of a Code Commission belief that
section 189 embodied the first degree felony-murder rule.' 89 No dif-
ferent treatment should be made of an assertion that the Code Com-
mission misinterpreted the Sanchez excerpt as being direct evidence
of section 189 codifying the second degree felony-murder rule. By
analogy to Dillon, the misinterpretation should be considered im-
material and the evidence capable of supporting an inference that the
Code Commission believed that section 189 codified the second degree
felony-murder rule.
The Attorney General in Dillon offered no proof that the Code
Commission actually misinterpreted the Sanchez excerpt.' 90 Only after
other evidence was presented independently suggesting that the Code
Commission intended section 189 to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule did the supreme court accept the Sanchez excerpt as ad-
ditional evidence of that intent.' 9' Additional evidence is needed,
therefore, that independently suggests a Code Commission intent to
codify the second degree felony-murder rule in section 189 before the
Sanchez excerpt may be considered of any persuasive value in sup-
port of a finding that the second degree felony-murder rule is codified
in section 189. The Dillon analysis provides this independent evidence.
187. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 356-57, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95.
188. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
191. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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The second component of the Dillon analysis, the negative preg-
nant construction of the present manslaughter statute, section 192,
provides independent evidence of an intent by the Code Commission
to codify the second degree felony-murder rule in an unspecified pro-
vision of the Penal Code. The pivotal language of section 192 defines
the crime of involuntary manslaughter and reads as follows: "[In-
voluntary Manslaughter] is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice,...in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount-
ing to a felony"'92 (emphasis added). The Attorney General success-
fully argued in Dillon that this language should be read as a negative
pregnant evidencing an intent by the Code Commission to provide
for a felony-murder rule in another statute.' 93 What should be noted,
however, is that the negative pregnant construction of section 192 is
not limited to evidencing an intent by the Code Commission to provide
only for a first degree felony-murder rule. The inference generated by
the construction of section 192 is that a killing occurring, without malice,
in the commission of any felony, including a felony that could sup-
port only a second degree felony-murder conviction, had been pro-
vided for by the Code Commission in another statute.' 94 The language
of the Dillon decision supports this conclusion. The court describes
the inference generated by the suggestive construction of section 192
as evidencing an intent by the Code Commission to provide for a
192. CAL. PENAL CODE §192.
193. 34 Cal. 3d at 469-70, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07 See supra notes
136-38, 146 and accompanying text. See also supra note 147.
194. Prior to the enactment of the Penal Code in 1872, section 25 of the 1850 "Act con-
cerning Crimes and Punishments"codified both first and second degree felony-murder. See Doyell,
48 Cal. at 94-95; 34 Cal. 3d at 465-67, 668 P.2d at 711-12, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05. Penal
Code Section 192 was based, in part, on section 25 of the repealed 1850 Act. CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. §192, Code Com. note (1872). See infra text accompanying note 203. The Dillon
court accepted the negative pregnant construction of Penal Code Section 192 as evidence of
legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-murder rule in another statute of the Penal
Code. 34 Cal. 3d at 470, 471, 668 P.2d at 714, 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 408. No language
in Penal Code section 192 or the Code Commission note to the 1872 version of that statute
suggests that the Code Commission intended to provide only for the first degree felony-murder
rule, or intended to abrogate the second degree felony-murder rule. See supra note 135; CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. §192, Code Com. note (1872). Without express language in a statute or
clear legislative intent manifested in another manner indicating that only one half of the felony-
murder doctrine which had existed since 1850 was to be provided for in the Penal Code, the
better inference to be drawn from the negative pregnant construction of section 192 is that
the Code Commission intended to provide for the felony-murder rule in another statute as
it existed before enactment of the Penal Code. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §5 (instructing
that Penal Code provisions that are "substantially the same as existing statutes must be con-
strued as continuation of those existing statutes"); Los Angeles Co. v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d
634, 644 (1942)(established law should not be presumed overthrown by the enactment of statutes
without a clear expression of legislative intent to that effect); accord, Theodor v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 92, 501 P.2d 234, 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 237 (1972).
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"felony-murder rule" unrestricted by degree.'95 Accordingly, the Dillon
court accepted the negative pregnant construction of section 192 as
evidence of a Code Commission intent to provide for the felony-murder
rule.'96 Absent evidence of a Code Commission intent to provide only
for a first degree felony-murder rule, the inference generated by the
negative pregnant construction of section 192 suggests that the Code
Commission intended to provide for the second degree felony-murder
rule in another statute as well as the first degree felony-murder rule. 97
Neither rule is excluded by the inference, therefore, both rules are
implicated because both are legitimate forms of the felony-murder
rule. If the Code Commission intended to provide only for the first
degree felony-murder rule when drafting the 1872 Penal Code, proof
of that intent must be provided by evidence other than the negative
pregnant construction of section 192.
At this point, two components of the argument offered by the At-
torney General in Dillon which persuaded the court to hold that the
1872 legislature intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule
in Penal Code section 189, the Sanchez excerpt and the negative preg-
nant construction of section 192, have been shown to evidence with
equal force an intent by the Code Commission to codify the second
degree felony-murder rule in the Penal Code. An additional piece of
evidence is available that was not emphasized by the Attorney General
in Dillon which also suggests an intent to codify the second degree
felony-murder rule. This evidence is the third component of the Dillon
analysis and is found in the Code Commission note to the present
manslaughter statute, section 192.
The third component of the Dillon analysis is the explanatory note
offered by the Code Commission to section 192 wherein section 25
of the 1850 Act is credited as a basis for section 192. 91 Section 25,
discussed earlier, declared any killing accompanied by a felonious in-
tent to be murder.' 99 The statute made no distinction between those
felonies capable of supporting a first degree murder conviction and
195. The court stated:
The Attorney General apparently contends the quoted phrase should also be read
as a negative pregnant implying that the commission had elsewhere affirmatively pro-
vided for a corresponding felony-murder rule.. .The inference is not unreasonable but
the question remains: which other statute was believed by the commission to codify
the felony-murder rule? (emphasis added).
34 Cal. 3d at 470, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
196. Id. at 470-72, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
198. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §192, Code Com. note (1872).
199. 1850 Cal. Stat., c.99, §25, at 220. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; 34 Cal.
3d at 465-67, 668 P.2d at 711-12, 194 Cal, Rptr. at 404-05.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
those capable of supporting a second degree murder conviction. 00
Any felonious intent coupled with a killing was declared to be murder
by section 25.201 Accordingly, section 25 was interpreted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court as codifying the second degree felony-murder
rule.202 The explanatory note to Penal Code section 192 reads in per-
tinent part: "This section embodies the material portions of Section
22, 23, 24, and 25 of the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1850. Y203
The Dillon court noted that no change in the meanings of the 1850
sections embodied by section 192 was intended upon enactment of
the Penal Code. 24 Assuming that the felony-murder provision of sec-
tion 25 was a material part of that statute, section 192 appears based
upon, in part, the felony-murder rule. Section 25 was interpreted as
codifying the second degree felony-murder rule; consequently, the Code
Commission appears to have intended section 192 to embody that
doctrine.0 5
A major problem derogating the persuasiveness of this evidence of
a Code Commission intent to codify the second degree felony-murder
rule in section 192 is the omission from that section of the felony-
murder language that characterized section 25 of the 1850 Act. 0 6 Sec-
tion 192 expressly limits the definition of manslaughter to killings,
without malice, in the commission of all unlawful acts except
felonies. 207 The language of section 192, therefore, appears unable
to be construed as codifying any form of felony-murder. The
significance of this omission from section 192 of the felony-murder
language of section 25 of the 1850 Act was addressed by the court
in Dillon when the defendant in that case offered that omission as
evidence of an intent by the 1872 legislature to abrogate the felony-
murder rule. 20 8 The court implicity rejected this omission as evidence
200. See 1850 Cal. Stat. c. 99, §25, at 220. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
201. 1850 Cal. Stat., c. 99, §25, at 220. See 34 Cal. 3d at 466, 668 P.2d at 711, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 404; Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94.
202. See Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94-95 (homicide during the commission of a felony not listed
in amended section 21 of the 1850 "Act concerning Crimes and Punishments" held to be sec-
ond degree murder); accord, Olsen, 80 Cal. at 127 (citing Doyell as support for a second degree
felony-murder conviction based on the felony of grand larceny). See generally 34 Cal. 3d at
466-67, 668 P.2d at 711-12, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05 (citing DoyelO.
203. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN, §192, Code Com. note (1872).
204. 34 Cal. 3d at 469, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
205. One supreme court decision has credited Penal Code Section 192 as authorizing ap-
plication of the second degree felony-murder rule. People v. McIntyre, 213 Cal. 50, 56, 1 P.2d
443, 445 (1931). McIntyre was cited with approval in Ford, 60 Cal. 2d at 795, 388 P.2d at
907, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
206. See supra note 105.
207. See supra note 135.
208. 34 Cal. 3d at 467, 668 P.2d at 712, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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of legislative intent to abrogate the felony-murder doctrine by holding
the first degree felony-murder rule to be codified in section 189.209 This
decision appears to be a compromise interpretation of the contradic-
tory inferences generated by the Code Commission note to section 192
which credits that statute as embodying the felony-murder rule, and
the deletion of the felony-murder language of former section 25 from
section 192. Section 192, while not credited by the court in Dillon as
the statutory basis for first degree felony-murder,2 0 was accepted as
evidence of legislative intent to codify felony-murder in another statute
because it was constructed as a negative pregnant. 21' For purposes
of this comment, the value of the explanatory note to section 192
appears to have been modified by the Dillon decision. Although the
Code Commission expressly credited section 192 as embodying the
felony-murder rule, the court in Dillon interpreted that code section
as evidencing only an intent by the Code Commission to codify the
felony-murder rule in another statute. '2
The Attorney General in Dillon faced a similar situation. Having
produced evidence of legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule, 1 3 the state was required to show which statute was
believed by the Code Commission to embody the rule.2"' The pro-
duction of this evidence persuaded the court to hold that the first
degree felony-murder rule had been intended by the 1872 legislature
to be codified in section 189.21" This author has furnished evidence
which suggests that the Code Commission intended to provide for a
second degree felony-murder rule in the Penal Code. This evidence
is the same as that accepted by the court in Dillon as proof of
legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-murder rule.21 6 Ad-
209. Id. at 471-72, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
210. Id. at 469, 472, 668 P.2d at 713, 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408.
211. Id. at 470, 472, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07, 408.
212. Id. The Dillon court acknowledged that section 192 embodied the former felony-murder
rule codified by repealed section 25 of the 1850 "Act concerning Crimes and Punishments."
34 Cal. 3d at 469, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The court, however, after accepting
the argument that section 189 codified the first degree felony-murder rule, did not re-address
the significance of the Code Commission note which credited section 192 as embodying the
felony-murder rule. 34 Cal. 3d at 472, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The supreme
court apparently believed that the Code Commission, by constructing section 192 as a negative
pregnant, channelled any intent to codify the felony-murder rule in section 192 to section 189.
Id. at 469-72, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08.
213. That evidence was the Sanchez opinion excerpt included in the Code Commission note
to section 189 of the 1872 Penal Code, and the negative pregnant construction of section 192.
34 Cal. 3d at 468-70, 668 P.2d at 713-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
214. Id. at 470, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407. See supra note 195.
215. 34 Cal. 3d at 471-72, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
216. The Sanchez opinion excerpt included in the Code Commission note to Penal Code
Section 189 was offered by the Attorney General in Dillon as evidence of a Code Commission
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ditional evidence of an intent by the Code Commission to provide
for the second degree felony-murder rule in the Penal Code is the
embodiment of the felony-murder provision of the 1850 Act, section
25, in section 192.217 No greater proof than that required of the At-
torney General in Dillon, therefore, should be required of the propo-
nent seeking to prove that the second degree felony-murder rule was
intended by the legislature to be codified in section 189. In Dillon,
persuasive evidence of legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule in section 189 was provided by the Code Commission
note accompanying section 455.218 The same note provides proof that
the legislature also intended to codify the second degree felony-murder
rule in section 189.
The Code Commission note to section 45519 is the fourth compo-
nent of the Dillon analysis. This note explains that the special felony-
murder provision of the repealed arson section of the 1850 Act, sec-
tion 5, was not adopted into the Penal Code. The note characterizes
the omitted felony-murder provision as "surplusage" because section
189 already codified the felony-murder rule for the underlying felony
of arson.220 The court in Dillon accepted this note as evidence of
which statute was believed by the Code Commission to codify the
first degree felony-murder rule.22" ' This last piece of evidence, com-
bined with the other inferences presented by the Attorney General,
persuaded the court to hold that the legislature intended to codify
the felony-murder rule for the felonies listed in section 189.222 The
logic of the Attorney General appears to have been that because
arson was one of the four felonies listed by section 189 in 1872, and
because arson felony-murder was believed by the Code Commission
to be codified in section 189, the Code Commission believed the felony-
murder rule to be codified for each felony listed in section 189.223
belief that Penal Code Section 189 codified the first degree felony-murder rule. Id. at 469,
668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The same excerpt has been shown to evidence a belief
by the Code Commission that Penal Code Section 189 codified the second degree felony-murder
rule. See supra notes 171-91 and accompanying text. The negative pregnant construction of
Penal Code Section 192 was offered by the Attorney General as evidence of a Code Commis-
sion intent to provide for the felony-murder rule in another statute of the Penal Code. 34
Cal. 3d at 469-70, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407. The same negative pregnant con-
struction has been shown to evidence an intent by the Code Commission to provide for a
second degree felony-murder rule in another penal statute. See supra notes 194-95 and accom-
panying text. See also supra notes 196-97, and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
218. 34 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
219. CAL. PENAL CODE ANr. §455, Code Com. note (1872).
220. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
221. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
222. Id. at 471-72, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
223. Id. at 471, 668 P.2d at 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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The supreme court accepted this logic, but refused to hold that the
Code Commission intended to codify the felony-murder rule for any
felonies other than those listed in section 189.224 The court empha-
sized this limitation by adding, via dictum, that the second degree
felony-murder rule was unaffected by the holding in Dillon and re-
mained uncodified common law. 225 By attaching this limitation to the
Dillon decision, the court moved without explanation 226 from the posi-
tion advocated by the Attorney General that section 189 codifies the
first degree felony-murder rule to the markedly distinct position that
section 189 codifies only the first degree felony-murder rule. The
supreme court emphasized that the listing of felonies in section 189
evidenced the extent to which the Code Commission believed that
statute codified the felony-murder rule.227 Section 189 only lists felonies
that trigger first degree murder punishment; 22 therefore, the supreme
court held, in effect, that the Code Commission only intended to codify
the first degree felony-murder rule.229 The assumption, however, that
the enumeration of felonies in section 189 evidences the extent to which
the Code Commission believed that section 189 codified felony-murder
is unsupported by the court in Dillon23 ° and finds no support in the
history of that section.
The primary purpose behind the enumeration of felonies by the
Code Commission in section 189 was to distinguish first degree murder
from second degree murder.23 ' The Code Commission expressly credited
section 189 as being modelled after the Pennsylvania statute of 1794232
which has been interpreted solely as a degree-setting device for
murder. 233 Within the explanatory note accompanying section 189234
224. Id.
225. Id. at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr at 408 n.19.
226. Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
227. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
228. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
229. The holding in Dillon that the 1872 legislature intended to codify the felony-murder
rule for the felonies listed in Penal Code Section 189, when coupled with the dictum of Dillon
that the second degree felony-murder rule remains judge-made law without express basis in
the Penal Code, supports this conclusion. See 34 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at
715, 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408, 408 n.19; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
230. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408. "
231. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872); Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 182,
481 P.2d at 196, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 188. See generally Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94-95 (analyzing amended
section 21 of the 1850 "Act concerning Crimes and Punishments" from which Penal Code
Section 189 was derived without material change intended. See supra notes 96-101 and accom-
panying text).
232. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872).
233. Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel Smith
v. Meyers, 261 A.2d 550, 553 (1970).
234. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §189, Code Com. note (1872).
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is the Sanchez opinion excerpt that was included by the Code Com-
mission to explain the degree-setting function of section 189.21 The
Dillon court held that the Sanchez excerpt is evidence that the Code
Commission believed section 189 to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule. 236 The court, however, did not hold that the Sanchez
excerpt was evidence that the Code Commission believed section 189
to codify only first degree felony-murder. 2" The legislative history
of section 189, therefore, offers no evidence that the listing of felonies
in that statute was intended by the Code Commission to limit the
codification of the felony-murder rule. Additionally, when the con-
struction of section 189 is viewed primarily as functioning to set the
degree for murder, the likelihood that the Code Commission would
have enumerated felonies capable of supporting a second degree felony-
murder conviction in that statute appears remote. Section 189 was
created in recognition of the varying degree of "atrociousness" in-
volved in different instances of murder.2 3 The statute lists those oc-
casions of murder considered the most reprehensible to society and
deemed by the legislature as deserving of first degree punishment. 2"
No instance of murder is listed unless deserving of first degree punish-
ment. The language of section 189 which reads "and all other kinds
of murder are of the second degree" uniformly labels every kind of
murder not listed as second degree murder."" Consequently, the court
should not look to what felonies are enumerated in section 189 when
deciding the extent to which the felony-murder rule is codified by
that statute because the Code Commission had no reason to list any
felony capable of supporting a second degree felony-murder convic-
tion in section 189. Second degree felony-murder, being a species of
second degree murder, would be provided for in the catch-all clause
"and all other kinds of murder are of the second degree"." '2 Enumera-
tion of felonies capable of supporting a second degree felony-murder
conviction, therefore, would have been unnecessary and completely
235. See 34 Cal. 3d at 469, 668 P.2d at 713, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
236. Id. at 471, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
237. The court labeled the Sanchez excerpt as evidence of a Code Commission belief that
section 189 embodied the felony-murder rule and did not limit Sanchez to evidence only a
Code Commission belief that section 189 codified first degree felony-murder. Id.
238. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN., §189, Code Com. note (1872).
239. Id.; accord, 34 Cal. 3d at 468, 468 n.15, 668 P.2d at 713, 713 n.5, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 406, 406 n.15. See generally Doyell, 48 Cal. at 94-95 (amended section 21 interpreted as
a degree-setting device for murder).
240. CAL. PENAL CODE §189. See supra text accompanying note 83; Fletcher, supra note
73, at 421.
241. Taylor, 112 Cal. App. at 356-57, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95. See supra notes 177-81
and accompanying text; Pike, supra note 73, at 118.
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at odds with the construction of section 189 which lists only those
murder situations deserving of first degree punishment. The Dillon
court, however, characterized the enumeration of felonies in section
189 as indicative of the extent of the intent of the Code Commission
to codify the felony-murder rule. 42 No support was offered for that
position.243 Moreover, no support has been found in the history or
construction of section 189 except evidence suggesting that the enumera-
tion of felonies was intended by the Code Commission to serve as
a means to distinguish first degree from second degree murder and
to codify the felony-murder rule for the listed felonies. The listing
of felonies in section 189, therefore, is not necessarily evidence of
a Code Commission intent to limit the codification of the felony-
murder rule by that statute. As a result, the explanatory note to sec-
tion 455 is able to serve as evidence of which statute was believed
by the Code Commission to codify the second degree felony-murder
rule.
The explanatory note to section 455 indicates that the Code Com-
mission believed that section 189 codified the felony-murder rule for
the underlying felony of arson.""4 The note provides direct evidence
of a belief by the Code Commission that Penal Code section 189
codified one form of the felony-murder rule. 4 5 This evidence that
the Code Commission understood one form of the felony-murder rule
to be codified in section 189 combines with the inferences provided
by the previously discussed components of the Dillon analysis to ce-
ment the argument that the second degree felony-murder rule was
intended to be codified in section 189. This argument is very similar
to and as persuasive as the argument made by the Attorney General
in Dillon. The inclusion by the Code Commission of the Sanchez opin-
ion excerpt in the explanatory note to section 189 can be construed
as evidencing a belief by the Code Commission that section 189
codified the second degree felony-murder rule.2'46 The negative preg-
nant construction of section 192 is evidence that the Code Commis-
sion intended to codify both degrees of the felony-murder rule in
another statute. 4 7 Further evidence of a Code Commission intent to
codify both the first and second degree felony-murder rules in the
242. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
243. Id.
244. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §455, Code Com. note (1872). See supra text accompanying
note 143.
245. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
246. See supra notes 171-81, 187-89 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 196-97 and ac-
companying text.
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Penal Code is provided by the explanatory note to section 192 which
credits that statute as embodying the felony-murder provision of the
repealed 1850 Act.248 Section 192 is not credited modernly with codi-
fying any form of the felony-murder rule; yet, the embodiment by
the statute of the felony-murder section of the repealed 1850 Act would
seem to be evidence of an intent by the Code Commission to codify
the felony-murder rule. 219 Lacking only direct evidence of the statute
believed by the Code Commission to codify the second degree felony-
murder rule, evidence that that statute was believed by the Code Com-
mission to be section 189 is provided by the explanatory note to sec-
tion 455. The court in Dillon accepted this same note as evidence
of a belief by the Code Commission that section 189 codified the
felony-murder rule not only for the underlying felony of arson but
for the entire first degree felony-murder rule. 250 No evidence exists
that the Code Commission intended to codify only the first degree
felony-murder rule in section 189.2 1 The explanatory note to section
455, therefore, operates in the same manner as in Dillon to answer
the additional question of which statute was believed to codify the
second degree felony-murder rule.252 Section 455 provides evidence
that the Code Commission believed section 189 to codify one form
of the felony-murder rule, and independent evidence suggests that the
Code Commission intended to codify the second degree felony-murder
rule in an unspecified statute. In the aggregate, the evidence suggests
that the Code Commission intended to codify both forms of the felony-
murder rule in the same statute: section 189. The Attorney General
offered no more proof than has been offered by this author to suc-
cessfully evidence legislative intent to codify the first degree felony-
murder rule in section 189.253 The conclusion is compelling, therefore,
that the second degree felony-murder rule was intended to be codified
in section 189.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held in Dillon that the 1872 legislature
intended to codify the first degree felony-murder rule in Penal Code
248. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
250. 34 Cal. 3d at 471, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
251. See supra notes 230-43 and accompanying text.
252. See 34 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 668 P.2d at 714-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08. See also supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
253. The sum of the proof offered by the Attorney General in Dillon consisted of three
components found in the four-component Dillon analysis: the Sanchez excerpt included in the
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section 189. The court was persuaded by an offering of proof which
consisted exclusively of inferences drawn from sources apart from the
express language of section 189. The express language of section 189,
moreover, was rejected by the Dillon court as directly codifying the
felony-murder doctrine. Nonetheless, the Dillon court, in dictum,
distinguished the second degree felony-murder rule as being judge-
made law because no express language exists in the Penal Code for
the doctrine. The Dillon decision teaches, however, that an express
basis for the second degree felony-murder rule in the Penal Code
should be an unnecessary prerequisite to codification. Proof of
legislative intent to codify the second degree felony-murder rule
establishes a statutory basis for the doctrine despite the absence of
express statutory language. The supreme court has not passed on the
issue whether the legislature intended to codify the second degree
felony-murder rule, therefore, the question whether the rule is statutory
remains unanswered. In the likely event that the supreme court enter-
tains a request to abolish the second degree felony-murder rule, the
court will need to decide, as in Dillon, whether the legislature intended
to codify the doctrine. Proof of legislative intent to codify the se-
cond degree felony-murder rule will preclude judicial abrogation of
the rule. This author has demonstrated that evidence which parallels
the proof accepted by the supreme court in Dillon suggests that the
1872 legislature intended to codify both degrees of the felony-murder
rule in Penal Code section 189. Consequently, this author concludes
that the second degree felony-murder rule cannot be abolished judicially
because the doctrine is codified in Penal Code section 189.
Daniel George Bath
Code Commission note to Penal Code Section 189, the negative pregnant construction of Penal
Code Section 192, and the Code Commission note to Penal Code Section 455. 34 Cal. 3d
at 468-71, 668 P.2d at 713-15, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08.
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